Inspired by the eminently successful physical theories and informed by commonplace experiences such as seeing a cat upon looking at a cat, conscious experience is thought of as a measurement or photocopy of given stimulus. Conscious experience, unlike a photocopy, is symbolic—like language—in that the relation between conscious experience and physical stimulus is analogous to that of the word "cat" and its meaning, i.e., arbitrary and yet systematic. We present arguments against the photocopy model and arguments for a symbolic conception (...) of conscious experience. Learning and the corresponding plasticity of the brain make a strong case for the symbolic conception of conscious experience, while many extra-ordinary conscious experiences argue against the formalisation of consciousness as a measuring device. The notions of place-value notation and grammar, which organise quantitative measurements and conscious experiences in the medium of numbers and language, respectively, are suggested as model systems for putting together a comprehensive theory of conscious experience. (shrink)

What is cognition? Equivalently, what is cognition good for? Or, what is it that would not be but for human cognition? But for human cognition, there would not be science. Based on this kinship between individual cognition and collective science, here we put forward Isbell conjugacy---the adjointness between objective geometry and subjective algebra---as a scientific method for developing cognitive science. We begin with the correspondence between categorical perception and category theory. Next, we show how the Gestalt maxim is subsumed by (...) the mathematical construct of colimit, a generalization of summation. The universal mapping property definitions of mathematical constructs, by virtue of being the best with respect to the universe of discourse, can be learned using reinforcement learning algorithms, which raises the possibility of abstracting the architecture of mathematics by artificial intelligence. Subsequently, we present naturality (to be contrasted with miracles), understood as 'Becoming consistent with Being', which governs the transformations of both things and their theories, as the zeroth law of change. Furthermore, the contrast---physical [mechanism] vs. biological [organism]---is smoothed via natural transformation, wherein transformations are respectful of the cohesion of the objects transformed. In closing, upon recognizing the scientific value of learning difficult-to-master differential calculus by physicists, of learning a strange four-letter language by biologists, and of learning the grammar of our respective mother tongues, we make a case for learning the theory of naturality / category theory for developing cognitive science. (shrink)

The hard problem of consciousness is explicating how moving matter becomes thinking matter. Harder yet is the problem of spelling out the mutual determinations of individual experiences and the experiencing self. Determining how the collective social consciousness influences and is influenced by the individual selves constituting the society is the hardest problem. Drawing parallels between individual cognition and the collective knowing of mathematical science, here we present a conceptualization of the cognitive dimension of the self. Our abstraction of the relations (...) between the physical world, biological brain, mind, intuition, consciousness, cognitive self, and the society can facilitate the construction of the conceptual repertoire required for an explicit science of the self within human society. (shrink)

Notions such as Sunyata, Catuskoti, and Indra's Net, which figure prominently in Buddhist philosophy, are difficult to readily accommodate within our ordinary thinking about everyday objects. Famous Buddhist scholar Nagarjuna considered two levels of reality: one called conventional reality and the other ultimate reality. Within this framework, Sunyata refers to the claim that at the ultimate level objects are devoid of essence or "intrinsic properties", but are interdependent by virtue of their relations to other objects. Catuskoti refers to the claim (...) that four truth values, along with contradiction, are admissible in reasoning. Indra's Net refers to the claim that every part of a whole is reflective of the whole. Here we present category theoretic constructions which are reminiscent of these Buddhist concepts. The universal mapping property definition of mathematical objects, wherein objects of a universe of discourse are defined not in terms of their content, but in terms of their relations to all objects of the universe is reminiscent of Sunyata. The objective logic of perception, with perception modeled as [a category of] two sequential processes (sensation followed by interpretation), and with its truth value object of four truth values, is reminiscent of the Buddhist logic of Catuskoti. The category of categories, wherein every category has a subcategory of sets with zero structure within which every category can be modeled, is reminiscent of Indra's Net. Our thorough elaboration of the parallels between Buddhist philosophy and category theory can facilitate better understanding of Buddhist philosophy, and bring out the broader philosophical import of category theory beyond mathematics. (shrink)

We define consciousness as the category of all conscious experiences. This immediately raises the question: What is the essence in which every conscious experience in the category of conscious experiences partakes? We consider various abstract essences of conscious experiences as theories of consciousness. They are: (i) conscious experience is an action of memory on sensation, (ii) conscious experience is experiencing a particular as an exemplar of a general, (iii) conscious experience is an interpretation of sensation, (iv) conscious experience is referring (...) sensation to an object as its cause, and (v) conscious experience is a model of stimulus. Corresponding to each one of these theories we obtain a category of models of conscious experiences: (i) category of actions, (ii) category of idempotents, (iii) category of two sequential maps, (iv) category of brain-generalized figures, and (v) functor categories with intuition as base and conceptual repertoire as exponent, respectively. For each theory of consciousness we also calculate its truth value object and characterize the objective logic intrinsic to the corresponding category of models of consciousness experiences. (shrink)

Neuroscientific discourse on consciousness often resorts to "collection of elements", notwithstanding the Gestalt demonstrations against representing conscious experience as a collection of sensory elements. Here I show that defining conscious experience as an object of the category of conscious experiences, instead of as cohesion-less set of structure-less elements, provides the conceptual repertoire—basic shapes, figures, and incidence relations—needed to reason about the essence of conscious experiences and the essence-preserving transformations of conscious experiences. Viewed in light of the category of conscious experiences, (...) designers of user experience—in designing pre-conceptualized user experiences—are well situated to contribute to the development of the science of consciousness. (shrink)

Kahneman's 'Asian disease' has nothing to do with Asians or their diseases; it is disrespectful of the basic principles of psychology. The attendant research--fooling people--is not science. Here I show how to build a science of the mind.

The 'Science of Knowing: Mathematics' textbook is the first book to put forward and substantiate the thesis that the mathematical understanding of mathematics, as exemplified in F. William Lawvere's Functorial Semantics, constitutes the science of knowing i.e. cognitive science. -/- This is a textbook, i.e. teaching material.

Math literacy is miniscule compared to the near universal language literacy of mother tongues. Our search for the root cause of this undesirable human condition led us to: Grammar (or the abstract essence) of a language. Language learning begins with grammar, unless the language happens to be mathematics, which is unique in not even considering including the grammar (abstract general/theory) of mathematics in the mathematical pedagogy. Here we make a case for introducing the abstract essence of mathematics--Conceptual Mathematics--in high school (...) math curriculum. Recognizing that the singular purpose of education is to nurture the universal yearning for understanding, we show how a nurturing pedagogy naturally resolves the "learning crisis", with the solution manifesting as human development. Furthermore, the nurturing pedagogy that we advocate invariably results in the culture of research excellence. (shrink)

There is a lesson from the woods--Bollywood, Kollywood, Mollywood, and Tollywood--of make-believe, which speaks to the core concern of science: the practice of science. Puspha, an Indian movie that brought the movie industry to its senses, with its global popularity has this to say: Be thyself; keep it real. Situated in a remote region aeons apart from the vast concrete and intimate plastic world we are familiar with, the happenings in the distant and alien universe of discourse--a hamlet adjacent to (...) tribals, forest, and nature--is surprisingly universally relatable. Here I show how the unity of being and the attendant naturality of becoming or, in the words of Tolkien, "the inner consistency of reality" of Pushpa is what made people all over the world relate to each and every character/scene in Pushpa. In doing so, I bring out its (arts and/or humanities) relevance to the practice of science in general and science policy in particular, with emphasis on changing human behaviour, especially in the context of COVID. (shrink)

What is Gandhi’s Satya? How does truth entail peace? Satya or truth, for Gandhi, is experiential. The experiential truth of Gandhi does not exclude epistemological, metaphysical, or moral facets of truth, but is an unequivocal acknowledgement of the subjective basis of the pursuit of objectivity. In admitting my truth, your truth, our truth, their truth, etc., Gandhi brought into clear focus the reality of I and we—the subjects (or viewpoints) of subjective experiences (views). The totality of these subjective viewpoints, along (...) with their mutual relationships, constitutes an objective frame of reference for reconciling or putting together seemingly irreconcilable perceptions into a unitary whole of mutual understanding and an ever more refined comprehension of reality, thereby engendering peace. Considering the generality of the basic tenet—viewpoint dependence of views—of Gandhi’s satyagraha and in view of the kinship between positive conception of peace and unity, I put forward ‘satyagraha for science’ as a method to address numerous foundational problems in various branches of science centered on unity such as the binding problem in neuroscience. (shrink)

What is reality? How do we know? Answers to these fundamental questions of ontology and epistemology, based on Mahatma Gandhi's "experiments with truth", are: reality is nonviolent (in the sense of not-inconsistent), and nonviolence (in the sense of respecting-meaning) is the only means of knowing (Gandhi, 1940). Be that as it may, science is what we think of when we think of reality and knowing. How does Gandhi's nonviolence, discovered in his spiritual quest for Truth, relate to the scientific pursuit (...) of truth? Here we show that Gandhian nonviolent knowing of nonviolent reality is an abstraction of both individual knowing (looking, reasoning) and collective scientific knowing (measurements, calculations). Specifically, Gandhi's truth-through-nonviolence is a law-like summation of the methods of physics ("do not disturb" of measurements) and of mathematics ("do not tear" of calculations) that are used to know. Moreover, physics (with its lawful behaviour of bodies) and biology (in preserving the meaning of genetic code) do affirm that the defining attribute of reality is nonviolence. In light of these correspondences, the Mahatma's derivation of a universal method of knowing (nonviolence of preserving-structure) from a universal truth (nonviolence of consistent-becoming) constitutes a science-supported general theory of reality and knowing. (shrink)

Beginning with an examination of the deep history of making things and thinking about making things made-up in our minds, I argue that the resultant declarative understanding of the procedural knowledge of abstracting theories and building models—the essence(s) of the practice of science—embodied in Conceptual Mathematics is worth learning beginning with high school, along with grammar and calculus. One of the many profound scientific insights introduced—in a manner accessible to total beginners—in Lawvere and Schanuel's Conceptual Mathematics textbook is: the way (...) we ought to think about things varies with the nature of things. In light of the universal yearning for understanding, it may be pedagogically unethical not to teach the eminently learnable Conceptual Mathematics. Summing it all, we need to champion the cause of taking Conceptual Mathematics to classrooms. (shrink)

Mind, according to cognitive neuroscience, is a set of brain functions. But, unlike sets, our minds are cohesive. Moreover, unlike the structureless elements of sets, the contents of our minds are structured. Mutual relations between the mental contents endow the mind its structure. Here we characterize the structural essence and the logical form of the mind by focusing on thinking. Examination of the relations between concepts, propositions, and syllogisms involved in thinking revealed the reflexive graph structure of the conceptual mind. (...) Objective logic of the conceptual mind is calculated from its structure. Noteworthy features of the logic of conceptual mind are: degrees of truth, varieties of negation, admission of contradiction, and the failure of a de Morgan's law. Furthermore, cohesion of the conceptual mind follows from its reflexive graph structure. Our characterization of the structure and logic of mind constitutes a substantial refinement of the contemporary cognitive neuroscientific conceptualization of the mind as a set. (shrink)

We call for a change-of-attitude towards reviews of scientific literature. We begin with an acknowledgement of reviews as pathways for the advancement of our scientific understanding of reality. The significance of the scientific struggle propelling the putting together of pieces of knowledge into parts of a cohesive body of understanding is recognized, and yet undervalued, especially in empirical sciences. Here we propose a nudge, which is prefacing the insights gained in reviewing the literature with: 'Our review reveals' (or an equivalent (...) phrase), that can bring about the desired cultural shift in the practice of science. The resulting elevation of the status of reviews to that of original findings would also bring about the desirable smoothening of the undesirable schism between theorists and experimentalists. (shrink)

Beginning with an examination of the recent Nature News centered on Harvard-Lancet-Mehra et al. COVID-19 research scandal, I put forth suggestions--for further debate--to safeguard the integrity of science in a time of crisis. In particular, I identify a subtle form of lying published as Nature news. Subsequently, drawing on Scarry's book "Thinking in an Emergency", I argue that slow reasoning and quick action (called for by crises) are not mutually incompatible; thinking can be transformed into conscious-reflex action by way of (...) practice (e.g. firefighters, emergency room physicians). More importantly, I call upon cognitive scientists, with their expertise in reasoning, intuition, habits, and actions, among others, to take a proactive role in crafting crisis preparedness programs for universities and science publishers so that we all can continue to rely on science for truth and facts. (shrink)

That the state-of-affairs of cognitive science is not good is brought into figural salience in "What happened to cognitive science?" (Núñez et al., 2019). We extend their objective description of 'what's wrong' to a prescription of 'how to correct'. Cognitive science, in its quest to elucidate 'how we know', embraces a long list of subjects, while ignoring Mathematics (Fig. 1a, Núñez et al., 2019). Mathematics is known for making the unknown to be known (cf. solving for unknowns). This acknowledgement naturally (...) raises the question: does mathematical knowing inform knowing in general? Here we show that drawing parallels to mathematical knowing can facilitate the advancement of cognitive science (Lawvere, 1994). (shrink)

Notions such as śūnyatā, catuṣkoṭi, and Indra's net, which figure prominently in Buddhist philosophy, are difficult to readily accommodate within our ordinary thinking about everyday objects. Famous Buddhist scholar Nāgārjuna considered two levels of reality: one called conventional reality, and the other ultimate reality. Within this framework, śūnyatā refers to the claim that at the ultimate level objects are devoid of essence or "intrinsic properties", but are interdependent by virtue of their relations to other objects. Catuṣkoṭi refers to the claim (...) that four truth values, including contradiction, are admissible in reasoning. Indra's net refers to the claim that every part of a whole is reflective of the whole. Here we present category theoretic constructions that are reminiscent of these Buddhist concepts. The universal mapping property definition of mathematical objects, wherein objects of a universe of discourse are defined not in terms of their content, but in terms of their relations to all objects of the universe is reminiscent of śūnyatā. The objective logic of perception, with perception modeled as [a category of] two sequential processes (sensation followed by interpretation), and with its truth value object of four truth values, is reminiscent of the Buddhist logic of catuṣkoṭi. The category of categories, wherein every category has a subcategory of sets with zero structure within which every category can be modeled, is reminiscent of Indra's net. Our thorough elaboration of the parallels between Buddhist philosophy and category theory can facilitate better understanding of Buddhist philosophy, and bring out the broader philosophical import of category theory beyond mathematics. (shrink)

Our conscious experiences are qualitative and unitary. The qualitative universals given in particular experiences, i.e. qualia, combine into the seamless unity of our conscious experience. The problematics of quality and cohesion are not unique to consciousness studies. In mathematics, the study of qualities (e.g., shape) resulting from quantitative variations in cohesive spaces led to the axiomatization of cohesion and quality. Using the mathematical definition of quality, herein we model qualia space as a categorical product of qualities. Thus modeled qualia space (...) is a codomain space wherein composite qualities (e.g. shape AND color) of conscious experiences can be valued. As part of characterizing the qualia space, we provide a detailed exemplification of the mathematics of quality and cohesion in terms of the categories of idempotents and reflexive graphs. More specifically, with qualities as commutative triangles formed of cohesion-preserving functors, first we calculate the product of commutative triangles. Next, we explicitly show that the category of idempotents is a quality type. Lastly, as part of showing that the category of reflexive graphs is cohesive, we characterize the adjointness between functors relating cohesive graphs to discrete sets. In conclusion, our category theoretic construction of qualia space is a formalization of the binding of qualitative features (colors and shapes) into the cohesive objects (colored-shapes) of conscious experiences. Compared to the feature-vector accounts of conscious experiences, our product-of-qualities account of consciousness is a substantial theoretical advance. (shrink)

Our manuscript addresses the foundational question of cognitive science: how do we know? Specifically, examination of the mathematics of acquiring mathematical knowledge revealed that knowing-within-mathematics is reflective of knowing-in-general. Based on the correspondence between ordinary cognition (involving physical stimuli, neural sensations, mental concepts, and conscious percepts) and mathematical knowing (involving objective particulars, measured properties, abstract theories, and concrete models), we put forward the functorial semantics of mathematical knowing as a formalization of cognition. Our investigation of the similarity between mathematics and (...) cognition led us to argue against the compartmentalization of scientific knowledge and ordinary cognition, and make a case for the understanding of the basic science of knowing in terms of functorial semantics. Recognizing functorial semantics as an elementary form of cognition can help advance cognitive science the way calculus helped in the advancement of physics. (shrink)

Cognition involves physical stimulation, neural coding, mental conception, and conscious perception. Beyond the neural coding of physical stimuli, it is not clear how exactly these component processes constitute cognition. Within mathematical sciences, category theory provides tools such as category, functor, and adjointness, which are indispensable in the explication of the mathematical calculations involved in acquiring mathematical knowledge. More speci cally, functorial semantics, in showing that theories and models can be construed as categories and functors, respectively, and in establishing the adjointness (...) between abstraction (of theories) and interpretation (to obtain models), mathematically accounts for knowing-within-mathematics. Here we show that mathematical knowing recapitulates--in an elementary form--ordinary cognition. The process of going from particulars (physical stimuli) to their concrete models (conscious percepts) via abstract theories (mental concepts) and measured properties (neural coding) is common to both mathematical knowing and ordinary cognition. Our investigation of the similarity between knowing-within-mathematics and knowing-in-general leads us to make a case for the development of the basic science of cognition in terms of the functorial semantics of mathematical knowing. (shrink)

The irrational exuberance associated with contemporary artificial intelligence (AI) reminds me of Charles Dickens: "it was the age of foolishness, it was the epoch of belief" (cf. Nature Editorial, 2016; to get a feel for the vanity fair that is AI, see Mitchell and Krakauer, 2023; Stilgoe, 2023). It is particularly distressing—feels like yet another rerun of Seinfeld, which is all about nothing (pun intended); we have seen it in the 60s and again in the 90s. AI might have had (...) an inauspicious beginning, which may very well be the original sin, and our current predicament is the attendant divine condemnation. Being unable to stand it, however divine it may be, without further ado, I get to the genesis (instead of getting lost in the here-and-now of this or that so-called breakthrough of AI). Here's my unvarnished critique! (shrink)

There are three questions associated with Simpson’s Paradox (SP): (i) Why is SP paradoxical? (ii) What conditions generate SP?, and (iii) What should be done about SP? By developing a logic-based account of SP, it is argued that (i) and (ii) must be divorced from (iii). This account shows that (i) and (ii) have nothing to do with causality, which plays a role only in addressing (iii). A counterexample is also presented against the causal account. Finally, the causal and logic-based (...) approaches are compared by means of an experiment to show that SP is not basically causal. (shrink)

There are three questions associated with Simpson’s paradox (SP): (i) Why is SP paradoxical? (ii) What conditions generate SP? and (iii) How to proceed when confronted with SP? An adequate analysis of the paradox starts by distinguishing these three questions. Then, by developing a formal account of SP, and substantiating it with a counterexample to causal accounts, we argue that there are no causal factors at play in answering questions (i) and (ii). Causality enters only in connection with action.

In this paper an attempt has been made towards the design and evaluation of a solar parabolic trough collector (PTC) system integrated with a conventional oil boiler (COB) to increase the energy utilization effectiveness and reduce the environmental emission of the existing conventional oil boiler in the Kombolcha textile factory, in Ethiopia. The factory uses 8500 ton/annum of heavy fuel oil to generate 26 ton/hour of pressurized hot water at 140C temperature which causes an increase in greenhouse gas emissions, so (...) the solar parabolic trough collector hot water generation system will be an appropriate solution for this application. Based on the available annual solar radiation, estimates of the solar fraction, solar energy unit price and system pay-back period have been carried out. The proposed system has the potential to save 1055.9 ton/year of fuel oil. The unit cost of PTC solar energy is estimated to be 0.0088 $/kWh and the payback period of the plant is five years. Since the unit price of oil energy (0.0424 $/kWh) is much greater than the unit price of solar energy by a substantial margin (0.033 $/kWh) in Ethiopia, therefore the water heating system by a solar parabolic trough collector is a feasible alternative to heating by a conventional oil boiler. (shrink)

In the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad, one of the principal Upaniṣads, we find a venerable and famous story where the god Prajāpati separately instructs three groups of people (gods, humans, and demons) simply by uttering the syllable “Da.” In this paper, our concern is not with ethics but theories of meaning and interpretation: How can all divergent interpretations of a single expression be correct, and, indeed, endorsed by the speaker? As an exercise in cross-cultural philosophical reflection, we consider some of the leading (...) modern theories of meaning—those of Grice, Quine, and Davidson—in order to see if the Upaniṣadic story receives a natural home in any of them. We conclude that the story is best understood through Grice’s theory of meaning rather than Quine’s or Davidson’s. (shrink)